for our ships. As negotiations with the Lahej Sultan, who then owned the Aden Peninsula, had broken down, the deadlock was solved by force. The original owner of Little Aden was the Akrabi Sheikh, a quite unimportant person whose minute territory is surrounded on three sides by his infinitely larger and more powerful neighbour Lahej. Whether or not the Akrabi Sheikh was entitled to sell is a matter which has occupied the minds of the Sultans of Lahej from time to time even up to the present day, but sell the Sheikh did in 1888 and buy we did, and that for all practical purposes is that.

Aden has been safe from foreign aggressors since we ourselves filled that role in 1839, except for a brief period during the First World War when a part of what is now the Colony was occupied by Turkish forces. This rather curious state of affairs came about in this way: Lahej, the name usually given to the capital of the Sultanate of the same name, the premier of all the Protectorate States by virtue of the importance of that State combined with the fact that the Lahej Treaty was the first to be concluded in the year 1839, is only some 17 miles to the north of Sheikh Othman. In 1915 the Turkish wolf came down on the Aden fold by way of the donkey-cum-camel tracks from Taiz in the Yemen. The then Sultan of Lahej, a good friend of ours, marched against the common foe with what tribesmen he could rally to his banner and at the same time he very properly called on the General Officer Commanding the Aden Garrison for assistance. In Aden there was, of course, tremendous excitement as a column was hastily organised and assembled at Sheikh Othman. It was the most ill-fated column that ever set out; there were incredible delays at the start, with the result that the troops did not begin their advance until the sun was well up. It was the height of summer and the 17 miles across which they had to move on foot were sandy and devoid of practically all forms of cover. The water for the column was carried on camels; the camels ran away shortly after the start. Whether this was of their own volition or whether they were encouraged to do so by treacherous drivers is a matter of opinion, for no records of that disastrous march are known to exist. The troops continued their advance and they went on

2: Hickinbotham G-4, 5 (ca. 1931-ca. 1957)
1958 MM1 Aden MM1

175
648
• 726
721

over the hot sand, some of them to their death from heat exhaustion and thirst, but most of them did, in fact, arrive at the thin palm groves of the Lahej Oasis. Many more would have failed and died but for the European merchants of Aden, who, obtaining ice from the ice factories in the town, sent it out in Ford cars after the column. The cars stuck in the sand, but mercifully not all in the same place, so that many of those who failed to complete the march and turned back found ice to sustain them at intervals across the desert until once again they were able to reach Sheikh Othman. As I have said, the majority of the column did reach Lahej and with it was an officer of my acquaintance who was one of the only two members of the Garrison who had ever been there before this disastrous military adventure. One day, twenty years later, as he and I drove together to Lahej to a lunch party being given by the Sultan, he pointed to a small clump of thorn bushes under which, on that memorable day, he had crawled to escape from the heat of the sun, utterly exhausted. He told me that when he had partially recovered he thought to himself: "If I stay here I shall certainly be shot as a deserter. If I try and go on I may die, but on the other hand I may get there." So choosing the uncertainty in preference to the certainty he did go on and he reached Lahej.

Those of the column who did get through were hastily reorganised and were disposed to meet the advancing Turks. By one of those odd changes of climate which occur in the tropics it poured with rain that night and it was indeed a miserable remnant of the column that saw the sunrise the next day. At daylight the troops moved forward through the northern limits of the Oasis and out on to the plain that leads up to the foothills to make contact with the Sultan's force, which they knew to be engaged with the enemy. The Sultan himself came riding back to meet these British reinforcements and to inform them of the enemy's dispositions and of those of his own soldiers. He met them. It was the last thing he ever did. They shot him dead. They thought he was a Turk, and then, without coming to grips with the Turkish forces at all, they turned back whence they had come, back all the way to

2: Hickinbotham G-4, 5 (ca. 1931-ca. 1957)
1958 MM1 Aden MM1

Aden. The Turks occupied Lahej as they had already occupied the territories of the Haushabi Sultan and the Amir of Dhala, two Protectorate rulers whom the British Government had undertaken to defend. They advanced to Sheikh Othman and they occupied the whole of the northern side of the harbour, even the Little Aden headland.

I have never understood why the combatants never fired at each other across the harbour. Maybe the Turks had no guns, or if they had, they were not powerful enough, or perhaps the guns of the fortress could not be trained away from the sea like those of an even greater fortress in a later and greater war. Whatever the reason, the fact remains that neither side seems to have made any effort to interfere with the other.

When I first knew the Residency, as Government House used to be called, there was mounted on the northern verandah overlooking the sea an enormous brass telescope beneath which a wooden table stood on which had been cut bearing lines on to the Turkish position on the north side of the harbour. The General Officer Commanding, who, at that time, was also the Resident, could thus with the least inconvenience to himself examine the enemy's position when he had finished his breakfast and before he applied his mind to greater things. The telescope still remains at Government House, though unfortunately the range table has disappeared.

The Turks remained in Sheikh Othman until eventually the General, another General this time, bestirred himself and marched against them; then they retreated to Lahej and they remained there until 1918 when Turkey was out of the war, and then they surrendered. Rude people say that the military authorities were induced finally to take belligerent action by the Committee of the Khormaksar Golf Club. The Golf Club's course, unfortunately, lay between the Turks and the British, and this was highly inconvenient to the members, so their representatives are said to have waited upon the General and pointed out that in the circumstances then prevailing golf was more exciting than comfortable. This tale may well be false and is certainly exaggerated, but there is no doubt whatsoever that there was a certain lack of initiative in the conduct of the

Aden

703 The way to do this is to use the Air Arm as much as possible. The Arabs are a proud race and rate personal bravery highly, as highly as they do prestige, and frankly, that is far too high. They will not give in to an inferior force, but will shoot it out to the end. They are unlikely to give in to a slightly superior force, but they will give in to an overwhelming force and often be secretly glad to do so.

648 I found when using the Government Guards or the Aden
• 726 Protectorate Levies to deal with petty malefactors that
703 if I sent a small but adequate force there was invariably a fight, but if I sent far more men than were necessary the malefactors' pride was saved and there was no blood shed.

648 An example of air-land co-operation based on actual fact
726 involves an aeroplane and two patrol cars. The aircraft was
703 on frontier reconnaissance patrol; the pilot spotted a lorry
706 travelling southwards inside the Protectorate border in a
707 prohibited zone. This was up on the Saudi Arabia-Aden frontier. He circled and at the same time wirelessed to the nearest frontier Post for patrol cars. The lorry was halted by a burst of fire well in front. A message was dropped and the lorry was ordered to remain stationary and wait for the patrol cars. It did so. The aircraft guided the cars to the lorry. It was loaded with rifles for distribution in the Protectorate and carried a number of well-armed tribesmen. There was no fight; the aircraft was the overwhelming force. The tribesmen were disarmed and the lorry was taken to the nearest Hadhrami Bedouin Legion Post. If the aircraft had not been used on patrol, the lorry would not have been spotted, and if the aircraft had not been there when the patrol cars arrived, there would have been a very unpleasant scene indeed. The tribesmen would certainly not have given in without a fight and lost the rifles, each one of which was worth locally one hundred pounds sterling.

648 In action against raiders from across the frontier in hilly
726 country, aircraft are not nearly so lethal as many think because
707 the lightly armed raiding tribesman has so much cover at his disposal. In fact they are very hard indeed to hit at all.

2: Hickinbotham G-4, 5 (ca. 1931-ca. 1957)
1958 MM1 Aden MM1

Casualties in these conditions are few as between the aeroplane and the enemy, but the aeroplane has a very considerable moral effect on our own troops as well as on the enemy. Ground-air co-operation can work wonders in bringing matters to a speedy conclusion by the denial of commanding features to the raiders and by giving covering support to advancing ground troops, and casualties among our own men are reduced to a minimum.

Aircraft operating alone cannot hold territory, nor can they in difficult country deny ground to the enemy indefinitely. I am writing of course of Colonial conditions and not of the use of thousands of aircraft in concentrated bombing operations as was the practice in Europe towards the end of the last war. What aircraft can do is to transport troops quickly and support those troops once they are in action, and that is the way they have been used in the Aden Protectorate. In this way lives are saved on *both* sides and, incidentally, it is in the long run the most economical method as well as the most efficient for watch and ward on a frontier in the conditions prevailing in the Aden Protectorate.

Now let us consider the role of the Air Arm in Internal Security work, and in particular the vexed question of bombing. Breaches of the peace in the Protectorate can be due to a number of causes and take various different forms. Sometimes there may be a genuine misunderstanding and a grudge or grievance nursed until it explodes into murder; sometimes a constitutional dislike, not unknown in the West, of paying taxes, takes the form of armed resistance to authority, the authority of the tribal Ruler; and sometimes a breach of the peace is the direct result of bribery, by a so-called friendly power, to murder, pillage and burn and disrupt security so that the economic, political and social development of the country is retarded. This last form of evil doing has been more prevalent in recent years. Uneducated people are easily misled by ready talkers, and rifles and money mean much to the wild tribesmen, especially when distributed with a generous hand. They little realise the harm they are doing themselves by burning schools and dispensaries. They are to be pitied as well as

2: Hickinbotham G-4, 5 (ca. 1931-ca. 1957)
1958 MM1 Aden MM1

721 punished. But it matters little what the cause of the crime, it is the method of punishment which is under examination. Let us, therefore, trace a normal sequence of events.

The incident has occurred, and the guilty party has been determined without doubt by the Political Authorities. Their Ruler asks Government to aid him in bringing them to account if it is beyond his power to act alone. The offenders are called upon to surrender themselves and explain their conduct. They do not appear on the date stated and no excuse is offered. The Ruler orders them to pay a fine in rifles or in money or in both. The fine is always well within the means of the guilty party to pay and is never vindictive. Payment is not made so the transgressors are warned that action will be taken to destroy their property, generally tribal towers, to the extent of the fine. Care is taken to make sure that the leader's property is first on the list for attention, and great care is taken to ensure that excessive damage is not done. Aerial photographs are taken and the actual towers or houses carefully identified. Twenty-four hours' notice of air action is then given and the transgressors are warned to remove their belongings. If at any time before the expiry of the warning period the persons concerned submit or make any move indicative of their willingness to submit, the whole operation is postponed immediately. If no move has been made by the guilty party then a further warning of one hour is given immediately prior to the air action. The first warning is dropped by air on the village or towers of the offenders, and to ensure that there is no mistake it is sent also by hand through neutral agents, probably Saiyids, but the second warning is from the air alone. The operation takes place and the bombing or rocketing of the buildings is very accurate and no unnecessary damage is caused. Quite often the offenders and their friends gather on a nearby hill feature to watch the aircraft in action. The incident is over. The slate has been wiped clean. There have been no casualties, there were not intended to be; only material damage has been done.

721 726 707 648 [202]

I do not recall that during the time I was closely connected with the Protectorate there were, at any time, any casualties

2: Hickinbotham G-4, 5 (ca. 1931-ca. 1957)
1958 MM1 Aden MM1

as a result of such operations. To have inflicted the same punishment in the more remote areas of the Protectorate, with land forces, would certainly have resulted in casualties on both sides, and would have been a long and laborious operation. Justice in the wilder and less civilised areas of the world, where memories are short, must not only be seen to be done, but it must be swift. Air action fulfils both these requirements, and is at the same time the most humane method. It seldom leaves any lasting feeling of resentment and more often than not normal relations have been resumed with the offenders in a few months or even weeks.

Sometimes air action cannot solve the Internal Security problem quite so readily and this is when the recalcitrants have no permanent dwellings, but live in grass huts or caves or just under trees in close proximity to the frontier. When they have been tempted and have fallen and have committed some gross offence then action has to be taken by air against their flocks, the only property they have, and when this fails action is taken to deny to them their grazing areas. Sometimes even this does not produce the required result, which is to persuade them to make submission and live in peace with their neighbours. Then ground and air action is taken to round up the men or to destroy them if they resist; the normal procedure when dealing with dangerous armed criminals in any part of the world. This may take long to achieve when the frontier is near and supplies of foodstuffs and money and shelter and compensation for damage done are all readily available from outside the Protectorate. The main fault is not with these poor, foolish, misled creatures, but with those responsible for leading them astray. They are the people who most deserve punishment and not their unfortunate dupes; but the principals are far away and out of reach in a "friendly" country. The loyal and staunch tribesmen, our friends, know where the fault really lies. We may understand why the punishment cannot fall where the result would be immediately successful in stopping at once the bribery and corruption which is the root of the matter, but they who depend on us and are loyal to us and who suffer from the depredations of the disrupters of the

2: Hickinbotham G-4, 5 (ca. 1931-ca. 1957)
1958 MM1 Aden MM1

721
726
233
648

peace have not our understanding of the world-wide considerations which influence our policy. They cannot understand our reluctance to take action, and I confess that on occasions I have been just as mystified.

2: Hickinbotham G-4, 5 (ca. 1931-ca. 1957)
1958 MM1 Aden MM1

636
643

Ash Shami's congratulations on his escape, to which he replied with his unexpectedly nice smile:

"You thought you had seen the last of me, didn't you? You are wrong again."

In 1956 when he was informed that we had taken the initiative and landed a force on Egyptian soil, he is reported to have said:

"Praise be to God, the old woman [Britannia] has woken up at last."

[648]

He has no love for Nasser and his poisonous radio broadcasts which have done so much harm. I am very glad I was not there to hear what he had to say when he learnt we had gone from Egyptian soil with the task we had set ourselves uncompleted. My sympathy is with those who carried the news to him; his forthrightness could be very embarrassing even when there was much less excuse for plain speaking.

AUDHALI

636
721
648
726

Farther to the west, and also on the borders of the Yemen, Sultan Saleh bin Hussein, the young Audhali Ruler, had consolidated his position to an extent which enabled him to remain unshaken, though it was a severe personal shock to him as he trusted their Sheikh, when the Dammanis, a sub-section of the Audhalis, forcibly resisted, at the instigation of the Yemen, our attempt to link the Audhali capital, Loder, with Nisab by motor road. The Yemen feared these new communications which would do much to consolidate the Protectorate and which in some peculiar way they seemed to connect with the supposed oil resources of Beihan. Shots were fired and on a show of force by the Aden Protectorate Levies the Dammani rebels fled across the border to be rewarded, encouraged and sustained by the authorities at Beidha, which is only about thirteen miles from Mukeiras and which I have myself visited on more than one occasion. From the Yemen the rebels raided into their own country at night, returning to their base in the Yemen before dawn.

648

Ever obedient to the referee's whistle we played the game

241 Hundreds of years ago Aden
133 the value of these silt-laden seasonal floods was realised by the
312 people of the plain, and they initiated an elaborate irrigation
134 system, the remains of which exist to the present day. Years of
926 inter-tribal warfare which benefited no-one, brought the
original system to ruin and the land went out of cultivation
and the silt-laden waters rushed unimpeded headlong to the
sea to discolour the ocean for many miles.

654 Hartley started with a modest capital of £10,000 granted
312 by His Majesty's Government for the purchase of seed grain
241 and for the hiring of bullocks to build dams and till the ground;
648 and with this modest sum he was able to bring 700 acres under
[926] cultivation. The tribes were loath to give up what had become
their battle-field, and their silly futile squabbles interrupted
Hartley's efforts until the patience of the Aden Government
was exhausted and measures were taken to enforce security
in the area.

648 Once the World War was over, food production was no
654 longer of paramount importance, and with the economic
248 future of the area in mind long staple Egyptian cotton cultiva-
178 tion was successfully introduced, and by an Administrative
Order of my predecessor, an organisation known as the
Abiyan Board was set up to manage the whole agricultural
project. Additional capital to the extent of £270,000 was
obtained as a loan from His Majesty's Government and there
was rapid development, so that by the time I became Governor
several thousand acres were under cotton cultivation. The
Board directed the agricultural policy of the area, was respon-
sible for pest control, owned and operated the heavy agricultural
machinery necessary for the economic working of the land,
owned and operated two cotton ginning factories, controlled
the distribution of flood water through the irrigation canals
and channels, and was responsible for the shipping and market-
ing of the cotton crop.

648 In spite of the changed circumstances of the Board they
continued to function by virtue of the original Administrative
Order. All efforts by my predecessor to regularise the position
by persuading the Fadli and Lower Yafa States, within whose
territories Abiyan is situated, to enact decrees failed owing to